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FEDERAL COMMON LAW
OF NUISANCE EXPANDS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL: A state may bring a federal common law action for nuisance
against an intrastate polluter to prevent pollution of interstate or
navigable waters. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623
(7th Cir. 1980).
In August, 1978, the Illinois attorney general filed an action in
federal district court on behalf of Illinois residents against Outboard
Marine Corporation (OMC) for allegedly discharging highly toxic
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)' from its Waukegan, Illinois manu-
facturing facility into North Ditch, Waukegan Harbor, and Lake
Michigan. The complaint alleged the PCBs threatened the health of
Illinois residents, damaged aquatic, bird, and water life in and near
these waters, and impaired Lake Michigan's usefulness as a public
water supply and recreation area.2 The state based its claim in part
on federal common law of nuisance and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA). 3 In addition to civil penalties, the attorney
general sought injunctions restraining further PCB discharge and
directing OMC to remove and dispose of PCB-contaminated sedi-
ments and soil.
The district court granted OMC's motion to dismiss the complaint
for lack of diversity jurisdiction, finding the federal common law
count deficient because the controversy was between two Illinois
parties. The complaint had failed to allege an injury to or from an-
other state.4 The state appealed the dismissal of the federal common
law claim.
On March 17, 1978, prior to the commencement of Illinois v. Out-
1. PCBs are highly toxic chemical mixtures that are heat and flame resistant. The com-
plaint alleged that hydraulic fluids used by OMC from 1959 until 1972 contained PCBs, and
that these fluids were still draining into the receiving waters through OMC's waste-water col-
lection and disposal system.
2. The complaint alleged that in some portions of Waukegan Harbor and its tributaries
PCBs currently comprised as much as 25 percent of the bottom sediments.
3. 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The state added several pendent
claims based on state law, including counts based on the Illinois Public Nuisance Act, the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act, nuisance, and trespass.
4. The court also concluded it was without jurisdiction to hear the FWPCA claim be-
cause Illinois failed to timely notify the defendant or administrator.
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board Marine Corp., the federal government filed a complaint against
OMC under the Refuse Act,' FWPCA, and the federal common law
of nuisance. After Illinois' complaint was dismissed, the Illinois attor-
ney general filed, on March 23, 1979, a motion for leave to intervene
in the federal suit, arguing the following points: (1) Illinois had a
statutory right to intervene under the Clean Water Act of 1977;6 (2)
Illinois' special interest in the litigation required intervention because
the federal government could not adequately represent that interest;
and (3) intervention was permissible because Illinois' claim coincided
with the federal government's claim. The same district judge who dis-
missed Illinois' initial complaint denied the motion to intervene. The
state appealed this decision also.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was thus presented with two
issues: whether Illinois had a federal common law cause of action in
nuisance against an in-state pollution source; and whether Illinois
could intervene in the federal government's suit against OMC. The
court of appeals reversed the district court's rulings, resolving both
issues in Illinois' favor.'7
The court of appeals significantly expanded the federal common
law of nuisance in the seventh circuit by holding that Illinois had a
federal common law cause of action in nuisance against an in-state
pollution source. The court's opinion began with a thorough discus-
sion of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,8 a landmark Supreme Court
case first establishing federal common law of nuisance. In that case,
Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous court, said the nation has a
basic, overriding federal interest in interstate and navigable waters
which requires the development of a uniform program to protect
these waters from pollution.9 Justice Douglas suggested a common
law of nuisance would fill in the gaps not covered by the FWPCA.1 0
The seventh circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court intended fed-
eral common law to apply to public nuisances which polluted either
interstate or navigable waters, regardless of the jurisdictional amount
or of the diversity of the parties. The court of appeals concluded that
"navigable," as defined by congressional legislative history, included
purely intrastate waters such as North Ditch and Waukegan Harbor.1
5. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1976).
7. OMC petitioned for a rehearing and rehearing en banc. The petition was denied on
April 29, 1980.
8. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
9. Id. at 103-04.
10. Id.
11. See Illnois v. Outboard Motor Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 627 n.14 (7th Cir. 1980), for
an expansive definition of navigable waters.
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The court thus concluded that "the Supreme Court established,
under federal common law, a right in tort for the pollution of inter-
state or navigable waters."' 2
The appellate court was not persuaded by OMC's argument that
the Supreme Court intended to limit federal common law of nuisance
to state actions against out-of-state polluters. The seventh circuit,
broadly interpreting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, concluded that the
Supreme Court had attached no significance to the fact that the pol-
lution came from an out-of-state source. Rather, the court reasoned
that the Supreme Court based its decision on the broad national in-
terest of controlling pollution in interstate or navigable waters be-
cause federal law ultimately controls such pollution.' 3
The court disagreed with the fourth and eighth circuit's narrow in-
terpretation of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. These circuits had
earlier concluded that Illinois v. City of Milwaukee was inapplicable
to intrastate pollution of navigable waters.1" In distinguishing the
two decisions from these circuits which interepreted Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee more narrowly, the seventh circuit noted the pollution
involved in these two cases had only an intrastate effect, while in this
case the pollution affected all four states bordering Lake Michigan.
Rather than relying on this factual distinction, however, the court
based its decision on the recognition in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
that a federal cause of action was necessary to abate pollution in
either interstate or navigable waters. The court stated that "there is
no basis for putting a gloss on the Supreme Court holding that would
restrict its application to situations in which one state complains of
damages to its environment or ecology by a pollution source in an-
other state."' I Thus the court held that Illinois' right to sue OMC in
federal district court fell within the purpose and scope of a national
policy of pollution control under federal common law.
The court offered several policy reasons for affording Illinois the
right to sue. First, states now only have to file a single suit in a single
forum as a result of this court's holding. Had this case involved two
plants, one on each side of the Illinois-Wisconsin border, each pour-
ing the same pollutant into Lake Michigan, Illinois would have had to
file suit in Illinois state court and a similar suit in federal court if
OMC's argument was applied. The court noted, however, that two
12. Id. at 629.
13. Id. at 627.
14. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1975); and Committee for Consideration of Jones Fals Sewerage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
15. 619F.2dat629.
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separate suits would prove unsatisfactory; each polluter in each suit
could argue that most or all of the pollution was produced by the
other plant, thereby precluding Illinois from obtaining injunctive re-
lief. Thus, "[b] ringing a single action against both defendants in one
forum would prevent them from hiding behind each other."' 6 Sec-
ond, a suit in federal court would avoid multiplicity of suits, promote
economy of judicial administration, and result in uniform decisions
by allowing both state and federal governments to join the suit.' '
Finally, permitting a state to sue in federal court further insures that
a state will continue to pursue an active policy of pollution control
without having to fear that its ability to attract industry is being im-
paired. Without access to a federal forum, a state that vigorously en-
forces its nuisance law increases the likelihood that industries subject
to that enforcement would favor investing in another state with less
stringent enforcement policies.' I Providing states with a cause of
action in a federal forum, however, results in further "development
of a comprehensive federal law of nuisance ... [which] can be en-
forced against polluters no matter where the pollution originates."' I
The court of appeals further concluded that where either interstate
or navigable intrastate waters were polluted, a showing of extraterri-
torial pollution was not a necessary requirement for federal court
jurisdiction.2" Rather, the crucial inquiry was whether the dispute
was a matter of federal concern in terms of the nation's policy to
control pollution of interstate and navigable waters. 2'
Illinois was also granted its motion to intervene in the federal suit.
Finding that Illinois had a statutory right to intervene under the
Clean Water Act, the court ruled that Illinois' intervention was both
practical and desirable in order for the federal forum to consider the
state's interests and views.2 2
CONCLUSION
The importance of this decision is two-fold. First, the reach of fed-
eral protection under the federal common law of nuisance appears
now to extend to navigable waters that are purely intrastate. The
court's decision, therefore, supplies states in the circuit with an addi-
tional tool for combatting pollution within their territorial bound-
16. Id. at 630.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 631.
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aries. Second, these states now have the opportunity to sue intrastate
polluters on the basis of federal common law without satisfying the
federal jurisdictional requirement of diversity. By eliminating these
jurisdictional barriers, these states can now freely choose between a
state or federal forum in which to sue intrastate polluters.
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